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A comparative study is undertaken that explores Chinese and Indian pharmaceutical 
industries under different patent regimes. It is found that relative to India, which had 
implemented process patent until 2005, China with a product patent regime since 1993 
suffers from both lower drug accessibility and availability (the latter is a missing 
parameter in the literature). Also, China lags behind in both lower R&D investment and 
patents filed by Chinese nationals. Based on these findings and associated legal 
interpretation, we conclude that higher patent protection in China generates negative 
impacts on the pharmaceutical industries. Thus, governments should utilize TRIPS 
flexibilities and other regimes like price control to offset the anticompetitive effect in 
designing patent policies. 
Keywords: product patent, process patent, TRIPS, pharmaceutical industries, China, 
India 
JEL classification: O34, L65, F14  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Adam Swallow at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
Acknowledgements 
The author would like to thank Guanghua Wan, Qin Zhang, Carsten Fink, Ravi Bangar, 
Christoph Spennemann, and anonymous referees for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. All views expressed in this paper are the personal views of the author and 
do not necessarily represent the views of the South Centre or its Member States. 
 
   1
1 Introduction 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS 
Agreement) concluded during the Uruguay Round negotiations has led to some changes 
in the development of pharmaceutical industries. The TRIPS Agreement, which came 
into effect on 1 January 1995, sets out the minimum standards of protection for all WTO 
Members. As the TRIPS Agreement implies a substantial increase in terms of patent 
protection, this paper intends to deal with the following research question: Does a 
higher standard of patent protection under the TRIPS Agreement have a positive impact 
on pharmaceutical industries in developing countries? 
This paper attempts to compare the welfare effects of patent protection on 
pharmaceutical industries in China and India respectively. Such a comparison study is 
possible for two reasons. First, product patent protection for pharmaceuticals has been 
enforced in China since 1993 (even prior to the introduction of TRIPS to the WTO), 
which represents one of the longest experiments in setting a higher patent standard 
protection on pharmaceuticals in developing countries. Second, product patent 
protection had not been re-implemented in India until 2005, which makes a comparison 
possible, with presumably a lower patent protection standard on pharmaceuticals.  
The structure of this paper is arranged around the central task of illustrating the theme. 
Following this introduction, Section 2 compares the differences between the key 
obligations of process patent protection and product patent protection on 
pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS. Section 3 reviews the literature surrounding the 
subject matter, while Section 4 compares Chinese and Indian patent patterns and the 
welfare effects of product patent regimes on pharmaceuticals in China and India 
respectively. Section 5 presents some interpretations and recommendations, with 
conclusions drawn in Section 6. 
2  Key issue: process patent protection vs product patent protection 
A key legal requirement of the TRIPS Agreement is for all WTO Members to replace 
process patent with product patent in all fields including pharmaceuticals. Why does the 
process patent and product patent debate attract considerable attention in the world of 
pharmaceuticals? 
Historically,  product patent was excluded in most developed countries. In France, 
product patent protection was prohibited under the law of 5 July 1844. Since then, 
French legislation has evolved and limited product patent was allowed on 2 January 
1966. In Germany, product patent was explicitly excluded under the law of 25 May 
1877 and was introduced as late as 4 September 1967. In Switzerland, product patent for 
pharmaceuticals was explicitly prohibited by the constitution for a long time and was 
introduced only in 1977. In Italy, pharmaceutical patents were prohibited until 1978. In 
Spain, product patent was introduced in 1986 as a consequence of the country’s 
accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) and the law was effective from 
1992 (Boldrin and Levine 2005) (see Figure 1). Likewise, product patent was 
traditionally excluded in developing countries. Nearly fifty developing countries did not 
grant patent protection for drugs when the Uruguay Round began in 1986 (Lanjouw   2
1998). The rationale behind this was to allow local pharmaceutical companies to 
produce patented drugs by using new processes. Countries may therefore pursue a self-
sufficiency policy for the pharmaceutical industry to ensure an adequate supply of 
medicines at affordable prices to cover the broadest spectrum of diseases (Frischtak 
1989). 
Technically, a chemical compound (a pharmaceutical product) can be obtained through 
different processes and methods. From a legal perspective, product patent protection 
would prevent all other processes and methods from producing the same chemical 
product. In contrast, under process patent protection, a second producer can produce it 
provided that an alternative method is used to make the same chemical product.  
Economically, a process patent regime promotes a more competitive environment, 
compared to the monopoly regime created through a product patent. The key lies in the 
fact that the impact of downstream innovation associated with these two forms of patent 
protection is substantially different. A process patent would reward the downstream 
innovator without preventing further innovation while a product patent can prevent 
further innovation. This issue is particularly important in the area of pharmaceuticals. 
An inter-industry survey shows that patents are most important to protect innovation 
within pharmaceutical industries (Levin, et al. 1987). Only five of 130 industries 
surveyed rated product patents as a method to prevent duplication higher than six (on a 
seven-point scale) and pharmaceutical industries were one of the five. The explanation 
for this lies in the unique characteristics of molecules and compounds and the fact that 
they are extremely easy to copy once discovered (Nogués 1993). In short, a product 
patent regime increases the patent protection standard significantly comparing to a 
process patent regime. 
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3 Literature  review 
This section aims to provide an overview concerning the implications of higher standard 
of patent protection in developing countries. As one of the basic justifications of a 
patent regime is to foster dynamic innovation as compensation to static losses by 
granting temporary monopoly rights, the literature review focuses on two dimensions of 
patent protection: (a) static effects; and (b) dynamic effects. 
3.1   Static effects 
There is a level of consensus among economists that developing countries will suffer a 
loss in welfare in the short run with reinforcement of IPRs. Earlier work (Chin and 
Grossman 1988) suggests that even if IPRs enhance global efficiency for substantial 
innovations, developing countries would incur important losses and world welfare 
losses may emerge. Consumers in the developed countries may also suffer from an 
increase in global prices and other productive inefficiencies if patent protection 
becomes global (Zuniga and Combe 2002).  
Nogues (1993) presents an analytical framework to assess the social losses incurred by 
the introduction of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. He stresses that the social 
costs of introducing patent protection depend very much on the pre-patent structure of 
the pharmaceutical market. This is because patents sustain monopoly prices and if the 
pre-patent market situation is characterised by competition, the introduction of patents 
will entail higher social losses than if that situation is characterised by monopolistic 
behaviour. 
Correa (2000) states that static loss is particularly relevant to small countries that rely 
heavily on technology inflows and lag considerably behind the product cycle. These 
small economies will find it increasingly difficult to access newly patented inventions if 
other access or commercialisation incentives are not implemented.  
The negative impact of stronger patent protection has been confirmed by several 
empirical studies. Simulating the introduction of patent protection for pharmaceuticals 
by assuming different market structures and different demand price elasticities, some 
studies found non-negligible price increases and welfare losses in southern countries 
(Nogues 1993; Maskus and Konan 1994; Subramanian 1995). Fink (2000) highlights 
the importance of available, close and off-patented therapeutic substitute drugs that can 
restrain prices and limit potential welfare losses. 
3.2 Dynamic  effects 
Contrary to the above consensus regarding negative static effects, the assessment of the 
dynamic effects of strong patent protection is less categorical. Some theoretical analyses 
assumed a positive relationship between the strength of patent protection and the rate of 
innovation. To cite a few examples, according to Kamien and Schwartz (1974), Glibert 
and Shapira (1990), Klemperer (1990) and Diwan and Rodrick (1991), an increase in 
patent protection unambiguously promotes innovation. 
Diwan and Rodrik (1991) show that if developing countries have a need for innovations 
that differ from that of developed nations, strong intellectual property protection may be   4
desirable. Hasper (2005) asserts that IPRs have a positive effect on the health conditions 
of people in developing countries. Drugs are not available for many diseases that affect 
developing countries because of weak incentives to manufacture these drugs. 
Governments of developing countries must negotiate with pharmaceutical firms to 
obtain these drugs, and stronger IPR protection increases the probability of successful 
agreements. Weaker IPR protection increases the chances of the drug being copied after 
it has been introduced, leading to a lower present day value of the drug and lower 
incentive for drug innovation.  
In contrast to the above optimistic views, a number of other studies suggest that there is 
a significant probability that stronger IPR protection may slow down technological 
progress in the long run. Chin and Grossman (1990), Deardorff (1992) and Helpman 
(1993) suggest that mechanistically transferring innovations from the developed world 
to developing countries is problematic. The spur to domestic innovation is modest in 
these settings. Segerstrom (1990) suggests that firms still find it profitable to maintain 
current technologies, to devote fewer resources to or delay investment in development 
activities and opt to wait longer before marketing a new product or technology. 
Therefore, extending patent protection to developing countries should not represent a 
strong stimulus to increase research and development activities; the technology gap 
separating rich and poor countries may eventually be wider. 
The preceding review reveals that the link between strong IPRs and the social welfare 
impact on pharmaceuticals in developing countries has not been well established. While 
it is less contentious that patent protection leads to static inefficiency, the dynamic 
benefits associated with stronger patent protection seem uncertain.  
Specifically, some weaknesses can be identified in the existing studies. First, studies on 
the impact of patents on prices and innovative activity focused almost exclusively on 
developed economies (Chaudhuri and Goldberg 2003). Second, empirical evidence 
regarding the impact of the TRIPS Agreement is rather limited. As most developing 
countries were required to implement the TRIPS in 2005, the actual impact is hard to 
assess given the limited period of TRIPS implementation. Third, existing studies 
generally do not differentiate patenting by foreign entities from that by domestic entities 
in a given country. In view of these limitations, the next section attempts to compare the 
welfare changes in pharmaceutical industries in China and India respectively under 
different patent protection standards. 
4  Comparisons between China and India 
The potential contribution of a comparative study between China and India rests on two 
premises. First, there have been contrasting legal settings in terms of patent protection 
in China and India during 1993-2005, with product patent in China and process patent 
in India, which makes the comparison of welfare impact between higher and lower 
standard patent protection possible. Second, there was a similar market structure in the 
domestic pharmaceutical industry in both China and India prior to the introduction of 
product patent in China in 1993 (see Figure 2). 
   5
Figure 2 Comparison of Chinese and Indian patent regimes  
 
The first China Patent Law was enacted on 1 April 1985. Only process patent protection 
was available. Once granted, such a process patent would be valid for 15 years. The first 
amendment of the Chinese Patent Law came into effect on 1 January, 1993. Under this 
amendment, product patent may be granted to pharmaceutical compounds used as active 
ingredients. Product patent may also be granted to chemicals extracted from animals, 
plants or minerals, provided they have value in pharmaceutical use and are not subject 
to prior arts. The term of patent protection was extended to 20 years. The 1993 China 
Patent Law Amendment was generally equivalent to the TRIPS standard introduced in 
1995. In comparison, India experienced two major Patent Act amendments, which 
influenced the pharmaceutical industries’ development path substantially. The Indian 
Patents Act (1970) introduced process patent to replace the product patent under 
inherited British colonial law from 1856, which lowered the standard of intellectual 
property protection substantially in India. The Indian Patent Amendment reintroduced 
product patent protection to fully implement the TRIPS Agreement commitment, which 
became effective in 2005. The key commitment is to introduce product patents that were 
hitherto covered by process patents from 1 January 2005. 
Clearly, there were domestic pharmaceutical industries in China and India prior to 1993 
when patent protection was introduced. Both countries achieved self-reliant 
development through reverse engineering. Prior to 1993, the Chinese pharmaceutical 
industry was characterised by a low degree of concentration: there were a large number 
of firms with small market shares and a low level of research and development. 
Similarly, prior to 1970 when the Indian Patent Act was enacted, the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector was very small (Ramani 2001). From 1970 onwards, Indian 
pharmaceutical firms slowly eroded the market share of Western companies. The 
Indian pharmaceuticals sector had been growing from almost nothing before 1970, to a 
prominent provider of health care products, meeting almost 95 per cent of the country’s 
pharmaceutical needs (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
2005). Domestic firms produced about 350 of the 500 bulk drugs consumed in the 
country in 1993 (Lanjouw 1998). Such a pro-competition pattern prevailed before 
product patent was re-introduced in 2005. As China and India had similar 
pharmaceutical drug market structures prior to the introduction of product patent, China 
and India might have suffered similar static welfare losses. 
1970  1995  2005 
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4.1 Static  effects 
With the introduction of patent protection, affordability and availability should be two 
major aspects to be considered when assessing static effects. Currently, while price, 
which affects affordability, is perceived as the dominant source of the static effect in the 
literature, little attention has been given to availability. This article covers both aspects. 
First, in terms of affordability, this section presents a comparison of selected 
pharmaceuticals in China and India. One recent case study illustrates the static impact of 
patents on drugs (Sun 2004). In 2001, for the purpose of monitoring medicine prices and 
improving access to essential drugs, the World Health Organization (WHO) and Health 
Action International (HAI) developed a standardised methodology for surveying the 
availability, affordability and components of medicine prices in developing and 
transitional countries. Data concerning 14 chronic disease medicines were collected in 
30 surveys that covered both China (Shandong Province) and India between 2001 and 
2005. To enable international comparison, the price data was expressed as median price 
ratios (MPR) rather than actual prices, with an international comparison between 
Chinese prices and international reference prices (WHO and HAI 2005). In the public 
sector of survey sites in China, the median of the MPR for patented brands (six core 
medicines) was four times higher than the international reference prices (Management 
Sciences for Health 2003). About 50 per cent of the patented brand medicines were in 
the range of 1.71-7.28 times higher than international reference prices. Table 1 
summarises the survey results in China. Comparison between the patented brand price 
and the price of the generic equivalent of ceftriaxone 1 g injection and omeprazole 20 
mg tablets illustrates that the median price ratio of the patented brand of ceftriaxone 
injection was about 18 times higher than that of the lowest generic price found in the 
clinic facilities surveyed. 
 
Table 1 Summary of median price ratios, public sector, 24 core medicines, Shandong, China 
  Number of core 









Patented brand  6  4.09  1.71  7.28 
Lowest priced generic 
equivalent 
10 0.93  0.69  2.88 
Source: Sun (2004) 
 
Contrary to China, India has been able to maintain low drug prices, which are among 
the lowest in the world. For instance, a comparison between a US patented drug and the 
equivalent Indian drug shows that the US drug price is 40 times higher than that of the 
generic drug found in India known as Omeprazole. A price comparison of certain 
blockbuster drugs between US and India is illustrated in Table 2.   7
Table 2: Blockbuster drugs price comparison of certain drugs in USA and India, US$ 




Brand name  Generic name  Dosage  Per tablet  Per tablet 
Prilosec/ Astra Merck   Omeprazole  20 mg  3.76  0.09 
Prozac/ Eli Lilly  Fluoxetine  10 mg  2.28  0.63 
Zocor/ Merck  Simvastatin  10 mg  2.07  0.21 
Zantac/ Glaxo-Wellcome  Ranitidine  150 mg  1.72  0.02 
Source: Chaturvedi and Chataway (2006) 
Second, in terms of availability, the survey results in Shandong Province, China, 
demonstrate that the availability of the drugs surveyed was very low in both public and 
private sectors. Among the core and supplementary medicines in both public and private 
sectors in survey sites in China, Candesartan, Ciprofloxacin, Co-trimoxazole 
suspension, Efavirenz, and Stavudine were not found at all. The other eight medicines, 
namely, Atenolol, Azithromycin, Fluconazole, Ganciclovir inj, Glibenclamide, 
Lisinopril, Ofloxacin and Olanzapine, whether generics or patented brands, were found 
in 10 per cent or less of the 40 facilities surveyed. 
In the public sector of the survey sites in China, 16 out of the 39 patented brand 
medicines were found in at least one clinic. Of these, availability across the facilities 
surveyed was very low, e.g., the highest availability of the patented brand is Diclofenac, 
which was available in only 45 per cent of the surveyed facilities. In private pharmacy 
outlets, while 17 patented brands were found in at least one pharmacy, only one 
patented brand, Diclofenac, was widely available (in 85 per cent of facilities surveyed). 
Therefore, the Chinese pharmaceutical market can be characterised as highly priced 
with very low availability by international standards. In comparison, the Indian 
pharmaceutical market is comparably more affordable and accessible. 
4.2 Dynamic  effects   
The amount of research and development investment and the number of patents (filing 
and granted) by nationals are two key indicators to assess the dynamic effects of the 
patent protection. Though not perfect, these two indicators illustrate to a certain extent 
the level of inventive activity and the innovative capabilities of a country in a specific 
sector. 
First, in terms of research and development investment, little evidence is found that 
incentives intended under a higher standard of patent protection after the 1993 Patent 
Law Amendment have contributed to stimulate Chinese domestic research and 
development activities.  
Chinese domestic pharmaceutical industries spent on average only 0.5 per cent to 3.0 
per cent of their turnover on research and development (The Centre for Management of 
IP in Health R&D 2005). The total amount of research and development expenditure for   8
Chinese-owned pharmaceuticals was even less than that of a single major Western 
multinational counterpart. Moreover, rather than undertaking fundamental research 
work, most of this research and development was oriented towards marketing and 
commercialisation. Consequently, about 97 per cent of about 3,000 Chinese owned 
pharmaceuticals produced generic drug versions of foreign brands.  
In contrast, Indian research and development expenditure allocated to pharmaceuticals 
is substantially higher than in China. As the TRIPs Agreement was foreseeable to 
prevent Indian firms from producing patented drug in 2005, Indian firms accelerated the 
pace to build up their capacity to innovate. From 2003 to 2004, pharmaceutical 
industries in India spent approximately 13.2 billion Rupees on research and 
development; representing 3.6 per cent of their turnover. Chaturvedi and Chataway 
(2006) suggest that from about 2 per cent of total sales around three to four years ago, 
the average research and development expenditure of the leading research-based 
domestic firms in India had gone up to around 5-6 per cent in by 2004. Among these 
companies, Ranbaxy, Dr Reddy’s, Cipla, Wockhardt, Torrent, Sun, Lupin and Nicholas 
Piramal are prominent examples. Ranbaxy is among the top 100 pharmaceutical 
companies in the world and the 15th fastest growing company. It kept a dedicated 
research facility in Gurgaon staffed with over 1,100 scientists. It spent US$ 75 million 
on research and development in 2004; a 43 per cent increase over its 2003 expenditure. 
Dr. Reddy’s research and development expenditure increased from 7 per cent in 2002-
03 to 10 per cent in 2003-04 and was slated to increase further in the future (Chaturvedi 
and Chataway 2006). 
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate that research and development expenditure has been rising and 
the trend is particularly strong among leading Indian companies, e.g., Ranbaxy, 
Dr Reddys, and Cipla (Reddy 2006). 
In terms of the patent applications, few were filed by Chinese nationals, according to the 
Invention Patent Bulletin issued by the Chinese State Intellectual Property Office. In the 
field of chemicals, 91.6 per cent of the patent applications were filed by foreigners, the 
majority of which were for new chemical synthetic medicines in 2004. In contrast, only 
a small number of patent applications were filed by Chinese nationals and most of these 
applications are process patent applications. Differing from the Chinese data, patents 
filed in India are mainly from domestic Indian firms. Two Indian entities, the Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research and Ranbaxy, were in the top ten of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization’s list in 2002. Patent applications by industry during 
1995-2000 indicated that pharmaceutical companies ranked highest with 396 
applications. India filed 392 Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA) in 2002. 
India’s share of ANDA filings has been rising consistently and stood at around 23 per 
cent in 2003 (Chaturvedi and Chataway 2006). 
An important conclusion can be drawn from the above comparisons: in China, while 
static losses on drugs are certain with poor affordability and availability of drugs, 
dynamic gains have not been generated with limited research and development 
expenditure and patent filing by nationals under the higher patent protection standard 
introduced in China since 1993. Therefore, China has been a loser on both static and 
dynamic effects with better patent protection. In contrast, India has been able to 
maintain a good level of drug affordability and availability, as well as promising 
innovation capacities with lower patent protection.   9
Table 3 Reported R&D expenditure by Indian pharmaceutical firms, 1991 to 2000 
 
Table 4 R&D expenditure of leading Indian companies 
 
5  Interpretations and recommendations 
5.1 Interpretations 
Why does higher patent protection have a negative impact on China’s social system? 
First, pharmaceutical innovation has a strong cumulative nature. Upstream patents affect 
follow-on innovations significantly. To illustrate this, it is important to examine how the 
pharmaceutical industry differs from other industries. The pharmaceutical industry is 
characterised by the ‘cumulative innovation’ paradigm (Basheer 2005). With this 
cumulative feature, broad patents, particularly on upstream chemical compound 
inventions, represent the main threat to competition in the context of the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
The process of creating a new drug is broadly divided into three phases: drug discovery, 
drug development, and commercialisation.  Throughout the entire research and 
development process, the emphasis is on defining a chemical compound, which is the 
first but determinant step (Rang 2006). As chemical compound patents stand in the   10
upstream of the product chain, a broad patent implies that follow-up inventions are 
dependent on the first patent. Legally speaking, the holder of the upstream patent has 
the right to exclude others from making, selling or using the invention protected by the 
patent, as well as preventing others from further research activities and commercially 
exploiting the invention. Without the authorisation of the first patent owner, a broad 
upstream patent may block further downstream research and consequently have a 
negative impact on drug development. 
A broad upstream patent is likely to lead its competitors to forgo research and 
development or refrain from engaging in such activities. Such effects deter market entry 
and follow-on innovation by competitors and increase the potential for the holders of a 
board patent to suppress competition (FTC 2003). In China, some multinationals have 
been exercising the right to prevent Chinese pharmaceutical companies from engaging 
in downstream innovation activities. To avoid infringing patents, Chinese 
pharmaceutical companies have to refrain from developing or continuing with a 
particular innovation that is dependent on the upstream patent. 
To sum up, welfare effects differ significantly depending on the patent breadth: a 
narrow patent (process patent) provides fewer obstacles for follow-up innovation. From 
a welfare perspective, policy makers should carefully design proper patent breadth to 
preserve competition, primarily by limiting the scope of patents on upstream inventions. 
Further, patent right has a distinct territorial nature. A patent is an exclusive right 
limited to the territory where it is granted. Thus, national welfare differs significantly 
depending on the nationality of patent owners. Let’s examine the welfare change by 
comparing a single-country model and a two-country model. In a single-country model, 
the nationality of an inventor is indifferent. The transfer of a consumer surplus from 
consumers to producers (inventors) does not change total welfare, except redistribution. 
In a two-country model, however, the welfare analysis is different. Let us assume that 
there are only two countries in the world; home country H, and foreign country F. 
Innovation activities are conducted in foreign country F. An inventor from country F is 
granted a patent in country H. Let us also assume that there was a perfect competitive 
market in H before inventor from country F was granted a patent in H. In this model, the 
static effects on country H depend on two factors: first, the size of the deadweight loss, 
and second, the nationality of the inventor who creates the new product. If newly 
available patent rights for pharmaceuticals in country H are assigned entirely to 
inventors from country F, the loss of consumer surplus is a net cost for country H. All of 
the profits accrue to country F in the form of royalties, if production remains in country 
H but under licence, or as export profits if the patented drugs are sourced from 
elsewhere and imported to serve the market in country H (Lanjouw 1998).  
In terms of dynamic benefits, where innovation activities take place in this two-country 
model matters. Such an impact can be differentiated as follows: Unless innovation 
activities of a newly-granted patent are carried out in the laboratories which the patent 
owner operates in country H, the dynamic profits of this patent which is supposed to 
mitigate the static loss for country H are not materialised. The national welfare change 
in country H is summarised in Table 5. If taking the cumulative nature of the 
pharmaceutical industry into account, a broad foreign patent would generate more 
national welfare loss for country H as a broad patent generates a strong negative 
incentive on follow-up inventions for country H.   11
Table 5 National welfare change of a foreign patent at H 
Welfare composition  Welfare change 
Static loss  Monopoly rent  Negative 
Deadweight loss  Negative 
Dynamic gain  Direct R&D activities at H  0 
Cumulative R&D activities at H  Negative 
Overall assessment  Negative 
 
The above analysis implies that the country of origin of the inventor does affect national 
welfare. Putting static losses aside, a higher number of domestic patents implies a 
stronger dynamic profit, whereby a lower number of domestic patents implies a heavier 
national welfare loss. Given the negative impact on follow-up inventions of a broad 
upstream patent, the welfare loss in country H would be further aggravated by a broad 
upstream patent with a foreign country of origin. 
5.2 Recommendations 
The negative effects of higher patent protection should represent an institutional failure 
of the TRIPS Agreement. Patents may deter the pace of innovation if patent breadth is 
not properly designed. Given the minimum standard of protection under the TRIPS 
Agreement, do national authorities have adequate policy space to pursue an optimal 
level of patent protection? Two policy options can be considered by developing 
countries.  
First, within the TRIPS Agreement, considerable legal flexibilities still remain for 
developing countries to pursue their economic objectives in the national context. Patent 
breadth, patent length and patentability are three major instruments. The degree of 
market power provided by a patent essentially depends on the combination of these 
three instruments. While the term of patent protection at 20 years from the date of filing 
is universal, patent breadth and patentability (height) are two flexible instruments to 
counter strong market power. For instance, in Japan, narrowly defined patents and 
promotion of cross-licencing were used effectively to keep drug prices in check while 
ensuring the introduction of new drugs. While the Japanese system used patent breadth 
as the main policy instrument to offset overly strong protection, it does not imply that 
the patentability requirement should be ruled out (Aoki et al. 2006). To demonstrate, 
adopting stricter patentability criteria is a way to reduce the potentials of blocking 
patents. 
Second, beyond the TRIPS Agreement, policy instruments to offset the blocking effect 
of patents include competition policy and price control. Competition spurs innovation. 
Firms may race to be the first to market an innovative technology. Companies may 
develop lower cost manufacturing processes, thereby increasing their profits and 
enhancing their ability to compete. Competition can prompt firms to identify 
consumers’ unmet needs and develop new products to meet those demands (FTC 2003). 
Drug price control is effective in offsetting the patent effect. The Indian government has   12
been proactive in defending the country’s interests through the introduction of the Drug 
Price Control Order. The aim of the 1970 Patent Act was to promote the development of 
an indigenous pharmaceutical industry and the provision of low-cost access to 
medicines for Indian consumers. A number of measures introduced including drug price 
controls, which helped keep Indian pharmaceutical prices low, and boosted the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry (Chaudhuri and Goldberg 2003).  
6 Conclusion 
This study shows that a higher standard of patent protection could generate welfare 
losses for pharmaceutical industries in developing countries. China has been suffering 
from both static and dynamic losses compared to India, with higher drug prices, lower 
drug availability and underdeveloped domestic innovation capacity. The comparison is 
made on two grounds: first, contrasting legal systems in terms of patent protection in 
China and India, i.e., product patent in China and process patent in India; second, a 
similar pre-product patent market structure in the domestic pharmaceutical industry in 
both China and India in 1993. As sufficient flexibilities exist within and beyond the 
TRIPS Agreement, the governments of developing countries should design socially 
optimal patent regimes by striking a balance between dynamic gains and static losses. 
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